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Abstract: Demand-Response (DR) programs, whereby users of an electricity network are encour-
aged by economic incentives to re-arrange their consumption in order to reduce production costs,
are envisioned to be a key feature of the smart grid paradigm. Several recent works proposed DR
mechanisms and used analytical models to derive optimal incentives. Most of these works, how-
ever, rely on a macroscopic description of the population that does not model individual choices
of users.
In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of those models and we argue that the macroscopic
descriptions hide important assumptions that can jeopardize the mechanisms’ implementation
(such as the ability to make personalized offers and to perfectly estimate the demand that is
moved from a timeslot to another). Then, we start from a microscopic description that explicitly
models each user’s decision. We introduce four DR mechanisms with various assumptions on the
provider’s capabilities. Contrarily to previous studies, we find that the optimization problems that
result from our mechanisms are complex and can be solved numerically only through a heuristic.
We present numerical simulations that compare the different mechanisms and their sensitivity to
forecast errors. At a high level, our results show that the performance of DR mechanisms under
reasonable assumptions on the provider’s capabilities are significantly lower than those suggested
by previous studies, but that the gap reduces when the population’s flexibility increases.
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Etude détaillée de mécanismes de “demand-response” : le
rôle des prévisions de consommation et des offres
personnalisées
Résumé :
Les programmes de “demand-response” (DR), qui consistent à donner aux utilisateurs d’un
réseau électrique des incitations économiques pour les encourager à réarranger leur consommation
de façon à réduire les coûts de production, sont pressentis comme étant un élément clef du
paradigme de la “smart grid.” Plusieurs travaux récents ont proposé des mécanismes de DR et
utilisé des modèles analytiques pour calculer les incitations optimales. Cependant, la plupart de
ces travaux s’appuient sur une description macroscopique de la population qui ne modélise pas
les choix individuels des utilisateurs.
Dans cet article, nous menons une analyse détaillée de ces modèles et nous soutenons qu’une
description macroscopique masque des hypothèses importantes (telles que la possibilité de faire
des offres personnalisées et d’estimer parfaitement la demande déplacé d’un timeslot à un autre)
qui peuvent compromettre l’implémentation des mécanismes. Nous partons donc d’une descrip-
tion microscopique qui modélise explicitement la décision de chaque utilisateur. Nous intro-
duisons quatre mécanismes de DR avec diverses hypothèses sur les capacités du fournisseur.
Contrairement à certaines études antérieures, nous observons que les problèmes d’optimisation
résultant des mécanismes que nous proposons sont complexes et qu’ils ne peuvent être réso-
lus qu’au moyen d’une heuristique. Nous présentons des simulations numériques comparant les
différents mécanismes et leur sensibilité aux erreurs de prévisions de consommation. Nos résul-
tats montrent que les performances des mécanismes de DR faisant des hypothèses raisonnables
sur les capacités du fournisseurs sont significativement moins bonnes que celles suggérées par
les précédentes études ; mais que la différence s’amenuise quand la flexibilité de la population
grandit.
Mots-clés : smart grid, demand-response, mécanismes d’incitation, réseau d’énergie
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1 Introduction
Demand Response (DR hereinafter) programs are envisioned to be a key feature of the Smart Grid
paradigm [1]. By means of economic incentives (discounts or penalties), DR schemes encourage
users to rearrange their consumption in response to the network state, thus mitigating the grid
overload and driving wholesale prices down.
Several analytical models are available in the literature, which describe and quantify the
effects of DR mechanisms. Whatever their specifics are, these schemes need to model how users
react to the incentives. Ideally the models should capture the most realistic features of a practical
DR mechanism while maintaining tractability.
Among these contributions, the authors of [2] study how an energy provider should select time-
dependent discounts to minimize its production costs. They assume that the percentage of users
who shift their consumption from slot i to slot j is a decreasing function of the temporal distance
between slots i and j and a concave and increasing function of the discount offered in slot j (Rj),
independent from discounts in other slots. The paper claims that, under these assumptions along
with the requirement of piecewise linearity of energy production costs, the problem of finding the
set of discounts that minimize the provider’s cost is convex and therefore simple to solve. Under
similar modeling assumptions, however, we find that the optimization problem can be non-convex
even in such a simple scenario (see Sec. 4). The same user’s model as in [2] is adopted also in
[3], where the optimization problem is extended in order to account for battery storages and
distributed renewable sources available into a specific microgrid. Authors of [4] propose a day
ahead pricing scheme which maximizes the provider’s profitability and capacity utilization. Users
are assumed to reschedule their consumption by comparing the utility vi they get by scheduling a
task in each timeslot i; therefore they allocate their consumption proportionally to these utilities,
i.e., they consume a fraction vi∑T
j=1 vj
of their total energy demand in timeslot i. The resulting
optimization problem is non convex but some relaxation techniques are introduced, which allow
one to calculate a solution within a reasonable amount of time. In [5], a more realistic model
is proposed where each user first calculates the welfare (defined as utility minus time-dependent
cost) she gets from consuming electricity in each of the possible timeslots, and then allocates all
the consumption to the slot returning the largest welfare. As we show below (see Sec. 4.4) this
model can lead to a much more complex optimization problem than the one presented in [5].
Finally, the authors of [6] propose a full-fledged game theoretical model, but their results hold
only if users experience a large number of interactions without any change in the system.
We claim that these studies rely on too strong assumptions, which jeopardize their usability
for practical purposes. Interestingly, we observe that the assumptions are sometimes hidden in
the macroscopic models the papers start from. In particular in this paper we focus on [2] and show
that its model requires personalized offers and a very precise forecast of the baseline consumption
of each user. The implementation of these features may require potentially significant costs in
terms of communication, measurement and computation infrastructure. Besides highlighting
these implicit requirements in the analytical framework in [2] (and then also in [3]), we explore
their potentials considering four DR mechanisms with different levels of complexity:
1. the base mechanism corresponds to an optimization problem similar to the one considered
in [2], it requires personalized offers and individual consumption forecasts; the energy
production cost is optimized over the discount values, each of which is offered to a given
fraction of the population,
2. the optimized mechanism takes full advantage of personalized offers and consumption fore-
casts by minimizing the cost over both the discount values and the population fractions to
which the discounts are offered,
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3. the robust mechanism relies on personalized offers, but does not need individual consump-
tion forecasts,
4. finally the broadcast mechanism (analogous to that in [5]) needs neither of the two features.
Interestingly, contrarily to prior studies, we find that the cost-minimization problems resulting
from our DR mechanisms are not convex (even for the base mechanism). Nevertheless, simple
heuristics can identify (potential) minima in a reasonable amount of time in realistic scenarios.
Then, our numerical results show that the simpler robust and broadcast mechanisms achieve
significantly lower cost reductions than the optimized mechanism, which is difficult to implement,
but that the gap reduces when the population’s flexibility increases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we discuss how the macroscopic models considered
in [2, 3, 4] hide some implicit assumptions about the user rationality or about the interactions
between the provider and the user. We define our microscopic model in Sec. 3 and then describe
different DR mechanisms and their corresponding optimization problems in Sec. 4. Finally, we
evaluate their performance numerically in a realistic scenario in Sec. 5.
2 Pitfalls when Starting from Macroscopic Models
In this section, we describe in more detail the macroscopic models proposed in the literature
for day-ahead price optimization. Consider a finite time horizon discretized in a set T of N
timeslots and a large population S of users. The baseline aggregate energy consumption in slot
j is denoted by E0j .
The energy provider charges a flat rate B, but it can offer discount rates to incentivize the
users to move some of their consumption so as to reduce the energy production cost. Due to
consumption shifts, the actual aggregate consumption in time slot j is E1j . Observe that a usual
assumption in the literature (including the papers mentioned above) is that the introduction of a
DR scheme neither reduces nor increases users’ demand; it merely rearranges users’ consumption







We denote the amount of consumption shifted from slot j to slot i 6= j as Ej→i, and the amount










We now start to further detail the model considering some specific assumptions made in
previous works. In [2] and [3], the electricity provider offers an energy price discount Ri ≥ 0
in each slot i. The users are assumed to react to these incentives by shifting a fraction of their
baseline consumption from slot j to slot i (|j− i| slots away) according to the following formula:
Ej→i = E
0
jSj(Ri, |j − i|). (2)
Sj(Ri, |j− i|) is called the aggregate sensitivity function and is increasing in the discount Ri and
decreasing in the temporal shift |j − i|, in order to take into account the user discomfort.
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The provider selects the vector of discounts R in order to minimize its total cost, equal to the
sum of the electricity generation costs and the loss of revenues due to the discounts. In particular













s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ B ∀i = 1, . . . N, (4)
where ci(·) is the cost of electricity production in slot i. Eq. (4) guarantees that discounts R
are non negative and smaller than the flat rate B, so that the money stream goes toward the
provider.
As it often happens, the devil is hidden in the details, and in this case in Eqs. (2) and (3).




j 6=iRiEj→i in Eq. (3) implicitly assumes
the possibility to reward only the consumption actually shifted from j to i, i.e., Ej→i, but
this quantity cannot be directly measured. The actual consumption E1i can be measured, and
then Ej→i can be quantified provided that we have good estimates of the sensitivity function
Sj(Ri, |j−i|) and of the baseline consumption E0i . Let us assume for a moment that Sj(Ri, |j−i|)
is known from historical data and that the aggregate baseline consumption may be predicted
with a reasonably high level of accuracy on a large set of users. Then it seems possible to solve
the macroscopic problem in Eqs. (3) and (4), but we need to consider also what should happen
at the microscopic scale. While the estimates for the aggregate baseline consumption can be
adequately precise, finally the billing is done at the user’s granularity and each user expects to
receive the price discount corresponding to the energy consumption she actually moved. If the
energy bill’s reduction does not correspond to her forecast, the user is likely to opt out of the
program (in particular if she has experienced underpayments) or to reduce her efforts and milk
occasional discounts. It appears then that Eq. (3) implicitly requires very precise predictions of
individual consumptions.
We now observe that the form of the sensitivity function Sj(Ri, |j − i|) in Eq. (2) indicates
that the amount of energy shifted from j to i depends on the discount Ri but not on the other
discounts. We can then ask ourselves which individual decisions may lead to this aggregate
behavior, an issue ignored both in [2] and [3]. As long as a rational individual is offered two
different discounts Ri and Rk, it seems natural that her decision to move some consumption
from j to i or from j to k or to keep it in j will take into account both the discounts. To
stress the point, consider a case when both Sj(Ri, |j − i|) and Sj(Rk, |j − k|) are positive, but
moving the consumption from i to k is both less inconvenient (i.e., |j − k| < |j − i|) and more
rewarding (i.e., Rk > Ri). There is then no reason why the user would move consumption to i.
The conclusion is the same for all the users and then we should have Ej→i = 0 at the aggregate
level, in contradiction with Eq. (2). We can then conclude that the expression of the sensitivity
function in Eq. (2) is not suited to model the situation when a user is offered two or more rewards,
but it can capture the case when the user decides between moving from j to i in exchange of a
discount Ri or staying in j. If every user is offered a single discount to move to a given slot, but
different users can receive different offers, then Eq. (2) can reasonably describe the macroscopic
effect of such personalized offers. The details are described in Sec. 4.1, here we only highlight
that Eq. (2) requires then that the electricity provider i) calculates an offer for each user, ii)
communicates individually to the user, iii) considers the individual offer when billing the user.
This is clearly more demanding than simply advertising to the whole population the same set of
discounts.
We observe that the equivalent sensitivity function considered in [4] poses similar problems.
Using our notation, we have Ej→i = vi∑
k∈T vk
E0j , where vi is the net utility a user gets by
consuming electricity in slot i and can be a function of the timeslot itself and of the discount Ri.
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This formula tries to capture the effect of the whole set of discounts, but it is not clear again
what is the underlying user’s model: if slot i has a larger utility than slot k (vi > vk), why should
the user consume in k?
3 Starting from a Microscopic Model
In the previous section we made the point that, while aggregate population models may be
convenient, it is necessary to explicitly consider the microscopic level: how the user takes the
decisions and how the provider and the user are supposed to interact. In this paper we follow the
opposite path in comparison to the existing works mentioned: we move from the microscopic level
to the macroscopic one. In particular, in this section, we start from a clear model of rationality
for the single user and then move to describe how aggregate quantities can be derived.
Each user u has a baseline energy consumption
{e0uj }j=1,...N , (5)




j for j = 1, . . . N . We assume in
what follows that users are homogeneous, i.e.,
∀ u, e0uj = e0j j = 1, . . . N. (6)
In section 5.1 we show how the DR mechanisms perform when this assumption does not hold.
User u is characterized by a private type Du = {duj→i}j,i=1,...N where duj→i indicates the
discomfort due to shifting one unit of consumption from timeslot j to timeslot i. We assume
that discomforts are expressed in monetary units; and that, ∀u ∈ S,
duj→j = 0 and d
u
j→i > 0, ∀j, i 6= j, (7)
i.e., there is a strictly positive discomfort if and only if consumption is shifted from its original
timeslot. The provider does not know the private type Du of each user u: from its point of view,
each discomfort duj→i is drawn from a known, continuous distribution Fj→i on [0, αj,i] (where
possibly αj,i = +∞). Discomforts of distinct users are independent but note that we do not
assume that, for a given user, the discomforts {duj→i}j,i=1,...N are mutually independent.
3.1 Rational Users
We assume that a user simply chooses the option that maximizes her utility. In particular let
T uj be a set of timeslots the user could move the baseline consumption e0uj to in exchange for
different discounts Ruj = {Ruj→k ≥ 0, k ∈ T uj }. The set pair (T uj ,Ruj ) defines the offer user u
receives for timeslot j. The set of options includes the possibility to keep the consumption in








We assume that if two or more timeslots are equally palatable, the whole consumption is shifted
to only one of them, picked at random with equal probability.
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3.2 Aggregation
We observe that the quantities duj→k in Eq. (8) are random variables, then two different users
could take different decisions while confronted with the same offers. The aggregate consumption
E1i , for i ∈ T , would then be a random variable. Here we assume (as it is implicit in the
other works) that we always work with large sets of the population so that the variability can be
neglected by approximating actual random quantities with their expected values. In particular, if
a subset Q containing a fraction q of the population receives an offer (Tj ,Rj), the corresponding











if the probability that a user has two or more equally palatable timeslots is zero. When dis-
comforts are continuous random variables (as we consider in this paper), this is always the case
if each user receives only one offer (the first three mechanisms introduced below) or if the dis-
comforts {duj→i}j,i=1,...N are mutually independent. In Sec. 4.4, we discuss how Eq. (9) should






simply as Pj→i(Ruj , Tj).
4 DR mechanisms
Under different assumptions on the provider’s capabilities, we introduce different demand re-
sponse mechanisms based on the microscopic model above, which are therefore practically im-
plementable. We introduce and study the corresponding optimization problems.
We start by the base mechanism that leads to the same aggregate optimization problem
considered in [2, 3].
4.1 Base mechanism
This mechanism requires that the energy provider can manage personalized offers to its cus-
tomers and moreover that it has perfect knowledge (or very precise estimates) of the baseline
consumption of each user.
The population is segmented intoN2 disjoint subsetsQj→i, for j, i ∈ T , respectively including
a fixed fraction qj→i of the population. Each user in Qj→i is simply offered to move her baseline
consumption in slot j (e0j ) to slot i in exchange for a price discount Ri.





Ri − duj→i > 0
)
as it can be obtained from Eq. (9), taking into account that in this case Tj = {j, i} and Rj −
duj→j = 0. We observe that the probability appearing on the right-hand side only depends on the
reward Ri and on the random variable duj→i. If the discomfort is only a function of the temporal
distance |j − i|, then the sensitivity function (the ratio of people who move from j to i) has the
same properties than in [2], in particular:
Sj(Ri, |i− j|) = qj→iPj→i(Ri),
where for Pj→i(·) we have made explicit the only variable it depends from.
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As we discussed in Sec. 2, because the provider knows exactly the consumption shifted from
each user, it can formulate the optimization problem (3-4). In [2] it is stated that the problem is
convex if i) the productions costs cj(·) are continuous piecewise linear and increasing and ii) the
discomfort distributions Fj→i(·) are continuous and concave. We show in Appendix A that this
is not the case by providing a counterexample. Stronger hypotheses are required for the problem
to be concave, as for example the linearity of the discomfort functions.
In particular in [2] the numerical evaluation considers






B · (|i− j|+ 1)
,











This particular expression for Pj→i can be obtained if duj→i is a uniform random variable with
support in [0, B]. The numerical results for the base mechanism in Sec. 5 are obtained considering
the same expression for the fractions qj→i.
Due to the non-convexity of the optimization problem (3-4) we cannot use one of the classic
algorithms for convex optimization. For the results shown in section 5 we have adopted instead
a multi start approach: we have generated random starting points uniformly distributed in
the problem domain and we have run per each point a descendent algorithm which converged
on a local minimum; the optimal offers are therefore those returning the smallest cost among
these minimizers. This approach does not guarantee convergence to the global optimum but its
reliability can be improved by increasing the number of starting points.
4.2 Optimized Mechanism
We have now understood which DR mechanism can lead to the optimization problem (3), but now
that we look at its implementation at the microscopic level and the need for personalized offers,
some specifics of the base mechanism look arbitrary and unjustified. For example, given that
discounts are not broadcast but each user receives an individual offer, why should the discounts
offered to the two disjoint sets of users Qj→i and Qk→i be equal to the same value Ri? It is clear
that the energy provider can further reduce the cost if it can independently choose Rj→i and
Rk→i. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the size of the sets {Qj→i} should be fixed,
the fractions {qj→i} can also be optimization variables.
We allow the provider to take advantage of these additional degrees of freedom that—we
repeat—do not impose any additional requirement to the system. We call this new DRmechanism
optimized. The load Ej→i(Rj→i, qj→i) rescheduled from j to i is now
Ej→i(Rj→i, qj→i) = qj→iPj→i(Rj→i)E
0
j (11)














s.t. 0 ≤ Rz→i ≤ B ∀z, i = 1, . . . N (13)
0 ≤ qz→i ≤ 1, z, i = 1, . . . N (14)∑
i qz→i ≤ 1, ∀z = 1 . . . N. (15)
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Eq. (13) guarantees that discounts R are non negative and smaller than the flat rate B, Eq. (15)
is a consequence of the fact that each user receives at most one offer for its baseline consumption
in a given slot.
The optimization problem (12-15) can be solved with the same heuristic proposed for problem
(3-4).
4.3 Robust Mechanism
The optimization problems (3-4) and (12-15) assume that the provider has perfect knowledge of
each user’s baseline consumption, so that it can correctly identify the consumption shifted and
reduce accordingly the energy bill. This assumption is probably unrealistic. If the provider does
not have such capability, then it can offer the user a discount for all the consumption in a given
timeslot i and not just for the consumption moved to i. The population is then divided into N
subsets Qi, each containing a fraction qi of the users. All users in Qi receive one and only one
offer: they are encouraged to shift their consumption from any timeslot in the time horizon to
timeslot i and they get the discount Ri for all the electricity consumed in i, including the one
originally in i.
We call this scheme robust, because it does not rely on estimates of individual consumption.
It is clearly simpler than the previous two, because the provider needs only to measure the
amount of consumption in i for the users who got the offer and to bill them accordingly.
The load Ej→i(Ri, qi) shifted from j to i is Ej→i(Ri, qi) = qiPj→i(Ri)E0j . Note that users
in Qi have no interest to move their baseline consumption away from i, then Ei→i = qiE0i . The












s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ B i = 1, . . . , N (17)
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , N (18)∑N
i=1 qi ≤ 1. (19)
Note that in Eq. (16) the first sum includes also Ei→i because all the final consumption in i from
the users in Qi is paid at a discounted price. The term does not appear in Eq. (3) and Eq. (12).
The optimization problem (16-19) can be solved with the same heuristic proposed for problem
(3-4).
4.4 Broadcast Mechanism
In the three mechanisms introduced above, the provider makes personalized offers to users in
selected fractions of the population. This may not always be possible (due to the complexity it
introduces for instance in billing) or desirable (for perceived fairness issues). Our last mechanism,
which is the simplest (in its definition), does not assume personalized offers. The provider selects
a single vectorR of discounts for every time slot and broadcasts these discounts to all users (hence
the name broadcast mechanism). Users then re-arrange their demand and pay the discounted
price for their demand in each slot (hence this mechanism also does not rely on the need to
estimate shifted demand).
As explained in Sec. 3.1, each individual user moves her demand from slot j to a slot (poten-
tially j itself) that maximizes her net utility (discount minus discomfort). Recall that if several
slots give equal net utility, the user chooses one of them randomly.
Until now, we have not made any assumption on the possible correlation of a given user’s
discomforts. This is because, in the previous three mechanisms, each user was receiving only one
RR n° 8881
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offer.In the broadcast mechanism, each user has several offers to compare to decide on his new
demand schedule, we therefore need to describe the discomfort correlations.
Let us consider now the particular case when two slots, say h and k may appear equally
attractive to a user, i.e. Rh − dj→h = Rk − dj→k. If we assumed that, for each user, the
discomforts {dj→i}{i,j=1,··· ,N} were mutually independent, this event would have probability
zero according to our assumption on Fi→j , and therefore it would not appear at the aggregate












However, rather than making the above independence assumption, we prefer to assume that
the discomforts have the form dj→i = βj |i− j|tj , where tj is a constant independent of the user
and βj is a random variable with concave Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Fj(·) This
model describes a symmetric delay sensitivity of users (users are indifferent between moving two
hours earlier or two hours later) while keeping the flexibility of users having a different flexibility
of demand of different times (since β and t are indexed by the origin timeslot j); but it also
introduces correlations between the discomforts of a user. As a result, the fraction of demand
shifting from j to i is
Pj→i(R)=
Pr (Ri − dj→i ≥ maxk 6=i {Rk − dj→k})
1 + 1R2j−i=Ri
, (22)
rather than (21). The denominator in (22) accounts for cases when a slot other than i (which
has to be 2j − i) gives equal net utility for all users. The broadcast mechanism then leads to














s.t. 0 ≤ Ri ≤ B ∀i = 1, . . . N. (24)
Unfortunately, due to indicator function in Eq. (22), the cost function (23) of the broadcast
mechanism is not continuous, even in very simple scenarios with continuous production costs.
See Appendix B for details. Discontinuity arises also in the macroscopic model in [5], but it
seems to have been ignored.
In practice, we solve problem (23-24) using the same heuristic proposed for the previous
problems, but we work on a continuous and smooth approximation of the cost function.
4.5 Ranking DR mechanisms
Under certain assumptions, the DR mechanisms introduced above can be partially ranked in
terms of the cost savings they generate.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the discomforts have the form dj→i = βj |i − j|tj , where tj is
a constant independent of the user and βj is a random variable with concave CDF Fj(·);and
assume that the production costs cj(·) are piecewise linear, continuous and increasing. Then, for
a given initial demand E0, the final cost generated by the optimized scheme is smaller than the
cost of the robust and base mechanism.
Inria
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Figure 1: Initial consumption E0 extracted from [2].The red lines represent the capacities C1
and C2.
See appendix C for the proof.
As we show in Appendix C, the ranking cannot be extended further. In particular, the broad-
cast and robust mechanisms cannot be compared (one or the other is more efficient depending
on the scenario).
5 Numerical Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of the different DR mechanisms in the realistic
scenario considered in [2] and based on energy data about the Ontario province in Canada. We
extracted from [2] the baseline consumption E0, reported in Fig. 1, the flat rate B = 110$/MWh
and the timeslot-independent cost function c(·) is piecewise linear with derivative:
c′(E) =
 $10 E ≤ C1,$72.46 E ∈ (C1 , C2),
$91 E ≥ C2,
(25)
where {
C1 = 16.3 GWh,
C2 = 17.9 GWh,
(26)
represent respectively the base to intermediate load capacity and intermediate to peak load
capacity. Baseline consumption E0 and the cost functions are estimated from the IESO energy
portfolio [9], consisting of nuclear plans, hydro gas powered stations and renewable and from
typical costs associated to these energy sources. We assume that discomforts take the form:
dj→i = βj |i− j|, (27)
where βj is an exponential random variable with CDF
Fj(β) = 1− e−
β
µ , (28)
where µ is a parameter representing the population’s flexibility. The larger it is, the smaller (in
a stochastic order sense) the discomfort of the users to shift their consumption.
In Figs. 2 and Fig. 3 we respectively show final load distributions E1 and optimal discounts
and segment sizes of the four DR mechanisms, for the flexibility parameter µ = 110 . Since
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Figure 2: Final consumption in GWh for the four DR mechanisms (µ = 110 ). The black lines
represents respectively C1 and C2.
Figure 3: Minimizers for the four DR mechanisms (µ = 110 ).
Inria
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Figure 4: Cost savings normalized to the initial cost, for various flexibility parameters µ.
production costs c(·) are constant across the horizon, provider’s costs are cut by flattening the
load; this is mostly clear in the optimized scheme where the peak of 19 GWh in E0 is reduced
to 17.9 GWh which is exactly the intermediate to peak capacity C2, as can be seen in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 4, we report the cost savings of the DR schemes, normalized to the initial cost,




3 , 1. The dashed line represents the
saving which could be achieved if users’ demand could be rearranged at the provider’s will
without providing any discount (we indicate it as the dictatorial solution). Consistently with
Proposition 4.1, the optimized mechanism returns larger savings than the robust and the base
ones. Interestingly, the robust mechanism performs consistently better than the base one despite
the fact that it does not require the ability to estimate the demand shifted and it therefore
“wastes” some discount by giving it to demand that was already scheduled in a given timeslot in
the baseline demand. Moreover, as the population flexibility increases, the savings gap between
the optimized scheme and the robust mechanism reduces, the latter being effectively close to
exploiting all the population’s flexibility.
In Fig. 5, we focus on the case µ = 13 and analyze the components of the cost for each DR
mechanism. Fig. 5 confirms that the optimized scheme provides the largest savings as it can
minimize the production cost while paying the smallest amount of discounts. We indicate with
wasted discounts the amount of discounts paid to consumption that would in any case have been
scheduled in that timeslot. The base and optimized mechanisms do not waste any discount,
while the robust mechanism and the broadcast scheme do, as they provide the discount Ri to all
the electricity consumed in i, including the part of E0i that remains in i.
5.1 The effect of noise
In this section we evaluate how sensitive the DR mechanisms are to the following two different
sources of randomness: 1) the number of users who accept an offer is a random variable and 2)
baseline consumption forecasts can be more or less accurate.
Let U be the total number of users. Under the base mechanism, if qj→iU users (or better
dqj→iUe) are offered the discount Ri to move their consumption from i to j, Eq. (9) assumes that
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Figure 5: Analysis of the components of the cost savings. All the quantities are normalized to
the initial cost.
qj→iUPj→i(Ri) of them accept. In reality the number of those who accept is a Binomial random
variable Uai→j , Bin(dqj→iUe, Pj→i(Ri)). Similar considerations hold for all the mechanisms.
About the second aspect, we consider that the energy utility solves any of the specific op-
timization problems introduced above, starting from the forecast E0i of the aggregate baseline
consumption for i = 1, · · ·N . Let e0i = E0i /U be the forecast of the individual baseline con-
sumption. We assume that the actual baseline consumptions (ẽ0i ) are i.i.d. random variables
with expected value E[ẽui ] = e0i (i.e. the energy utility forecasts are unbiased) and coefficient of





with expected value the forecast E0i and coefficient of variation δ/
√
U . This coefficient captures
the uncertainty of aggregate consumption forecasts.
We have then evaluated how the performance metrics change if these two sources of random-
ness are present, but are ignored by the energy utility in the optimization phase. For the base
and optimized mechanisms we maintain that the energy utility can estimate the exact amount
of energy shifted between two slots, even if this value is different from what predicted the day
ahead.
We considered U = 13.6millions users (equal to the current estimate of Ontario’s population).
Simulating the behaviour of each user would have been very time-demanding because we would
have had to generate NU random consumptions and roughly NU random choices for the offers.
Instead we have approximated by matching the first two moments: i) the Binomial random
variables Uj→i as gaussian ones and ii) the aggregate consumption of a group of U ′ users as a
lognormal random variable as suggested in [8]. We need then to generate only O(N2) random
variables.
We report in Figs. 6 and 7 respectively the final total costs and the cost savings achieved by
the DR mechanisms for µ = 1/3 and different values of the aggregate relative forecast uncertainty
δ√
U
. Usually the consumption forecast errors over large populations are evaluated to be of a few
percents. Results are averaged over 105 realizations of the set of random variables. Fig. 6
indicates that costs increase with uncertainty for both the DR mechanism and the idealized
Inria
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Figure 6: Global cost versus relative uncertainty δ√
U
(%).
Figure 7: Savings versus relative uncertainty δ√
U
(%). Savings are normalized by the initial cost.
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schemes. This feature is explained by the Jensen’s inequality as the cost functions (16), (3), (12)
and (23) are convex in the aggregated forecast E0. The figures confirm the relative ranking of
the DR mechanisms shown in Fig. 4, but for the base mechanism that appears to be the most
sensitive to the effect of noise and becomes worse than the broadcast mechanism already for
values of δ/
√
U as small as 0.2%.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that macroscopic descriptions of DR mechanisms can hide important
assumptions that can jeopardize the mechanisms’ implementation. For this reason, our proposal
moved from a microscopic description that explicitly models each user’s decision. We have then
introduced four DR mechanisms with various assumptions on the provider’s capabilities. Inter-
estingly, contrarily to previous studies, we find that the optimization problems that result from
our mechanisms are complex and can be solved numerically only through a heuristic. Moreover,
our results show that the performance of DR mechanisms under reasonable assumptions on the
provider’s capabilities are significantly lower than those suggested by previous studies, but that
the gap reduces when the population’s flexibility increases.
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A Problem (3-4) is not convex
We prove the problem is not convex by providing the following counterexample:
• N = 3 slots.
• Initial consumption in each slot: E01 = 1, E02 = 1, E03 = 2.
• Sensitivity functions to rewards: S2(Ri, |2−i|) = 1−e
−Ri/α2
|2−i| , S3(Ri, t) =
1−e−Ri/α3
|3−i| , concave
in Ri and decreasing in |j − i|. Consider α2 = 1, α3 = 1/10.
• Cost functions: ci(x) = βix. Consider β1 = 1, β2 = 11, β3 = 1/2.






















































= −5 < 0,
then it is convenient for the energy provide to increase the reward R1.







































































= −18 < 0,
then the function is not convex.
Moreover, this non-convexity is at a point where the derivative of the total cost is negative.
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B Proof of discontinuity of Broadcast mechanism cost func-
tion
Suppose the provider broadcasts discount rates R such that
Rz =
{
R > 0 if z = j − k, j + k
0 otherwise. (29)
The consumption shifted out of j will then be equally divided between the slots j + k and j − k.
In formulas, from (22) follows:









Consider now another discount R∗ such that
Rz =
 R+ ε if z = j + kR if z = j − k
0 otherwise.
(31)
where ε is a positive.








A positive arbitrary small ε generate a finite change in probabilties Pj→i. Hence Pj→i(R) are
discontinuous in R which is why the final cost (23) is discontinuous.
C Mechanisms ranking
We start proving proposition 4.1, i.e. that the optimized mechanism achieves a lower cost than
the robust and the base mechanisms.
We first observe that the base mechanism solves the same problem solved by the optimized
mechanism, but with the additional constraint that fractions qj→i have to be constant as indi-
cated in Eq. (10). The feasibility set of the base mechanism’s optimization problem is then a
subset of the feasibility set of the optimized mechanism’s optimization problem. It follows that
the optimized mechanism achieves a lower cost.
We now consider the robust mechanism, and assume that the pair (Rrob.,qrob.) is an opti-
mizer of ((16)-(19)). Choose the pair (Ropt,qopt) such that:





∀(j, i) s.t. j 6= i, Pj→i(Ri)qi = Pj→i(Rj→i)qj→i
and set
(Rj→j , qj→j) = (0, 0) ∀ j = 1, . . . , N
The two configurations (Rrob.,qrob.) and (Ropt,qopt) generate the same final distribution E1.
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Figure 8: Initial and final consumptions in example C.1.
However while the robust mechanism awards with a discount Ri a fraction qi of the consump-
tion E0i originally scheduled in i, the optimized scheme does not. So the optimized scheme can
achieve the same distribution provided by the robust mechanism paying less rewards. It follows
that the total cost achieved by the optimized mechanism is never larger than that of the robust
mechanism. This last point completes the proof.
The ranking cannot be extended further as we show through the following examples.
Example C.1. We show first a case where the broadcast scheme (23-24) provides larger savings
than the optimized one (12-15). Consider a three timeslots scenario with initial consumption
E0 =
{
10 j = 1
0 j = 2, 3
timeslot-dependent costs cj(·)
cj(E) =
 100E j = 110E j = 2
1E j = 3
and a maximum discount rate B = 20; finally assume discomforts are formulated as in (27) with
Pr(βj ≤ R) = 1− e−
R
6 (33)
Electricity provider can reduce the cost it carries by shifting consumption in timeslots 2 and 3
where there are zero demands and lower marginal production costs. We report in figures 8 and
9 respectively the rearranged consumptions and the minimizers of the optimized and broadcast
schemes. We observe that the optimized mechanism offer to all the users to move in to slot 2,
while the broadcast mechanism is able to have some of them moving to the more convenient slot
3. The final cost of the optimized scheme (12-15) is 311 and is larger than the final cost of the
broadcast one (23-24), 286.
The broadcast scheme is able to outperform the optimized scheme, because users can choose
between two different offers and then the more flexible ones move to slot 3 and the less flexible
ones to slot 2. On the contrary, in order to move some consumption to slot 3, the optimized
mechanism should offer to a fraction q1→3 to move, but those who do not accept the offer would
stay in 1 with corresponding elevated costs. Observe that this example has been built in such a
way that the broadcast mechanism does not “waste” rewards paying for consumption that does
not move.
Note that, due to Proposition 4.1, in this scenario the broadcast scheme allows larger savings
than the robust mechanism and the base scheme.
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Figure 10: Initial and final consumptions in example C.2.
Example C.2. We show here that the robust mechanism (16-19) can perform better than the
broadcast scheme (23-24). Consider the following three timeslots scenario:
E0 =
 6 j = 1;24 j = 2;
30 j = 3;
a timeslot independent cost c(·), such that
c′(E) =

1 E ≤ 9
9 E ∈ [9 , 18]
36 E ∈ [18 , 27]
78 E ≥ 27
and a maximum discount B = 10. Discomforts as formulated in (27) with
Pr(βj ≤ R) =
R
B
We report in figures 10 and 11 respectively the rearranged consumptions and the minimizers
of the robust and broadcast schemes. The final cost of the robust mechanism (16-19), 580.75 is
smaller than the final cost of the broadcast scheme (23-24), 594.
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Figure 11: Robust mechanism and broadcast scheme minimizers in example C.2.
The broadcast scheme assigns only a reward R1 to the first timeslot. Flexible enough con-
sumption will be moved from timeslots 2 and 3. Notably, the fraction of consumption shifted from
timeslot 2 is twice larger than the fraction of consumption shifted from 3 because the discomfort is
linear in the distance (see Eq. (27)). The broadcast scheme cannot alter this proportion, though
it could be beneficial as in timeslot 3 there is a larger demand. It then achieves an unbalanced
consumption in slot 1 and 2
On the contrary the robust mechanism can equalize consumption in slots 1 and 2 by offering
to a small fraction of the population to move to slot 2.
Observe that, because of Proposition 4.1, in this scenario also the optimized mechanism re-
turns larger savings than the broadcast one.
Example C.3. In this final example, we show that the base scheme can perform better than




10 j = 1
4 j = 2
a timeslot independent cost c(·), such that
c(E) =
{
10E E ≤ 7
15E − 35 E ≥ 7
a maximum discount rate B = 10 and discomforts formulated as in (27) with
Pr(βj ≤ R) =
R
B
In this scenario the robust mechanism and the broadcast one achieve a cost equal to 154.75,
larger than the cost of the base mechanism, 152.92. We report in figures 12 and 13 respectively
the rearranged consumptions and the minimizers of the three mechanisms.
In this scenario all the schemes the robust and broadcast mechanisms are equivalent: they
both shift the same amount of consumption to slot 2 and pay the same amount of rewards. The
base scheme performs better than the other two since it does not waste any discount, i.e. it does
not award discount to the demand E02 originally scheduled in timeslot 2. The base and broadcast
schemes do waste some discount and therefore offer smaller discounts than the base scheme,
rearrange smaller amount of demand and return a larger cost.
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Figure 12: Initial and final consumptions in example C.3.
Figure 13: Robust mechanism, optimized and broadcast schemes minimizers in example C.3.
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